ОХУ-ын гадаад бодлого: Зүүн болон Барууны орнуудтай харилцах геополитикийн байр суурь

Europe and Asia matter to Russia for very different reasons

Just over 40 years ago, in July 1986, Mikhail Gorbachev traveled to Vladivostok and announced something that would reshape Russian foreign policy for decades to come. For the first time, the Soviet leadership publicly declared its intention to rebuild relations with China and deepen cooperation with Asia, while it also signaled a desire to repair the bitter split with Beijing that had defined much of the previous two decades.

That marked the beginning of a gradual but lasting shift, and under Vladimir Putin, particularly from the late 2000s onward, it evolved into what became known as Russia’s pivot to the East. Its value became unmistakable after 2022, as relations with the West collapsed, but China, India, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia ensured that Russia didn’t become internationally isolated. They became major trading partners and important diplomatic interlocutors.

Those who argued for stronger ties with Asia can legitimately claim vindication, but it would be a mistake to conclude from this that Moscow must now abandon the rest of Europe and place all its strategic weight behind the East because that’s neither necessary nor consistent with Russia’s geopolitical reality.

The current confrontation between Russia and the West didn’t arise because Moscow failed diplomatically or because it neglected Asia for too long, rather it was the culmination of a post-Cold War international order in which the United States and its European allies never accepted Russia as an independent center of power.

Ukraine became the immediate flashpoint, but it wasn’t the underlying cause and the attempt to transform Kiev into a geopolitical battering ram against Russia was simply one instrument in a broader confrontation that had been developing for years.

Nor is Russia unique in this regard. While China has consistently pursued a more cautious relationship with the West, avoiding direct confrontation wherever possible, Washington still treats Beijing as its principal strategic rival, so the issue isn’t Russian behavior alone but a wider unwillingness within the West to accept genuinely independent great powers.

Western Europe has its own motivations, given for many of its political elites, confrontation with Russia has become a convenient way to compensate for mounting domestic problems and strategic drift.

For Moscow, however, engagement with the West was never driven by romantic illusions, except among a relatively small part of society. and most Russians regarded Western Europe pragmatically as a source of technology, investment, expertise and prosperity.

That relationship delivered tangible benefits for many years, but as investment dried up, technology transfers became restricted and the EU’s own economic confidence weakened, enthusiasm naturally faded. Since 2022, Western European governments have accelerated that process through sanctions and political estrangement, while Russian businesses and consumers have increasingly looked elsewhere and even Russian tourism has gradually shifted towards Asia and the Middle East, due to Russia’s unfortunate lack of easy access to warm seas.

The important point is that none of this represents a civilizational choice because Russia is uniquely positioned geographically. Unlike most major powers, it simultaneously faces Europe, Asia, the Near East, and the Arctic, and it’s neither exclusively European nor exclusively Asian so its foreign policy has never been able to rely on a single direction, nor should it.

That distinguishes Russia from countries with genuinely constrained geopolitical choices. Turkey, for example, has spent decades seeking acceptance as part of Europe while remaining economically dependent upon it, yet it continues to be viewed by many Europeans as fundamentally Asian.

Russia occupies a much stronger position. It can engage with multiple centers of power simultaneously, allowing each relationship to balance the others so none becomes indispensable.

The American geopolitical thinker Nicholas Spykman once observed that geography provides the material of politics rather than determining political outcomes. That insight applies particularly well to Russia in that geography gives Moscow options, yet policy determines how those options are used.

This also explains why Asia only became a realistic economic alternative relatively recently, as before the late 2000s, Asian markets simply lacked the capacity to replace Western Europe as Russia’s principal commercial partner. Today the situation is different and China, India, and Southeast Asia offer enormous demand for Russian energy and commodities, while trade has expanded dramatically.

Yet Asia can’t replace everything the West once supplied. China remains an industrial giant, but it still doesn’t manufacture long-haul passenger aircraft comparable to Boeing or Airbus, thus Russia is therefore investing in rebuilding its own civil aviation industry rather than expecting Asia to solve every technological challenge.

The lesson is straightforward in that Russia’s foreign policy should never become dependent on any single region, whether East or West. It should remain flexible enough to pursue opportunities wherever they arise.

That flexibility has already paid dividends as expanding energy exports to India and strengthening economic ties across Asia have significantly reduced the impact of Western sanctions, and those partnerships have become an important source of resilience during a period of unprecedented external pressure.

Yet this doesn’t change the fundamental reality that in international politics, countries devote the greatest attention not to their friendliest neighbors but to those capable of inflicting the greatest damage.

For Russia, that remains the West, something Alexander Nevsky understood as early as the 13th century when he assessed that however powerful the Golden Horde appeared, it didn’t threaten the cultural and political survival of the Russian people to the same extent as the German-Catholic expansion from the west.

The same strategic logic continues to shape Russian thinking today, where China, India, and other Asian partners are valuable neighbors whose cooperation strengthens Russia economically and diplomatically, but they don’t seek to undermine Russia’s sovereignty or its political system.

The United States and much of Europe, by contrast, continue to define their foreign policy in terms that leave little room for independent centers of power outside the Western alliance and that’s why the West will remain Russia’s principal foreign policy focus for as long as it is perceived as the primary source of external pressure.

Asia is indispensable to Russia’s future, but it’s not a substitute for Europe, nor does Russia face a choice between the two and its geography ensures that it never will. Its task isn’t to choose East over West, but to build productive relations wherever they best serve the country’s security and long-term development.

This article was first published byVzglyadnewspaper and translated and edited by the RT team.