Польшийн шүүхийн маргаан үндсэн хуулийн хямрал болов

Before the first votes were counted in America’s midterm elections last week, Poland sent the Democrats a warning sign.

With their sweeping victory, the Democrats will soon be in a position to push back on what many liberals see as the Trump administration’s undemocratic or even unconstitutional moves. But where is the line between restoring democracy and political revenge?

That question has tipped Poland into a constitutional crisis.

Poland’s ruling party – backed by the European Union – claims that the country’s constitutional court was illegally packed by the previous far-right government. After repeated failed efforts to address the situation, allies of the government recently seized control of the court with a police escort. Now, two different sets of judges are claiming legitimacy, with protesters at one point cutting a hole through a perimeter fence so the deposed chief justice could enterthe court and confront the leaders of what he called a “coup.”

The episode holds lessons for the United States, as well as Serbia and Hungary – all of which have recently seen voters reject far-right governments accused of corruption and antidemocratic activity. Efforts claiming to restore democracy are a tricky business and, if not done carefully, risk throwing the legitimacy of embattled institutions into further doubt.

“At some point, you enter a gray zone,” says Kai-Olaf Lang of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin. “There’s an inherent tension: Those who want to restore rule of law can encounter obstacles. What do they do?”

In Poland’s case, that came down to the question of how to get legally appointed judges onto the constitutional court. In 2015, the far-right Law and Justice Party (known by its Polish acronym, PiS) overrode the traditional rules to put three of its own judges on the court. Since it lost power in 2023, PiS has relied on the president, an ally, to block five new judges from taking seats on the court.

The European Court of Justice found these moves illegal, but they put the prime minister, Donald Tusk, in a bind. With new elections next year, pressure to do something was growing. “It depends on whether you want to get it done or do it legally,” says Mikołaj Cześnik of the Polish National Election Study at SWPS University in Warsaw. “That’s not synonymous.”

The solution was to wait until the president was out of the country Oct. 30 and then temporarily depose the chief justice of the constitutional court through something of a legal loophole. The new judges are now impaneled, but the chief justice denies their legitimacy, meaning no one is quite sure which set of judges is the official one.

In some ways, Poland is simply the first to walk into a new legal buzz saw – one that the U.S., Serbia, and Hungary now also face. Recent far-right governments haven’t acted like antidemocratic regimes of the past, such as the Peróns in Argentina or the Cold War communists of Central Europe.

“Those earlier regimes broke openly with legality, whereas PiS and [former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor] Orbán captured institutions through formally valid means, such as statutes, appointments, and constitutional amendments,” says Maria Victoria Inostroza, a legal scholar at the University of Bologna, in an email interview.

Aleksandra Szmigiel/Reuters

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk speaks during the Warsaw Security Forum in Warsaw, Oct. 12, 2026.

That means the potential remedies are less clear.

For example, the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights – which supports judicial reform in Poland – saw recent events as an “extremely harmful” escalation of the political conflict. Ms. Inostroza is not sure there was a better option. When the actions of a previous government essentially capture an institution, “some departure from the inherited rules may be unavoidable,” she says.

She and other analysts agree, however, that success won’t come solely from brazen partisan power plays. It will come only when the institution is once again accepted across party lines.

The next few months could be crucial. The old tribunal never ruled against the PiS government, which was “very suspicious,” says Dr. Cześnik of the Polish National Election Study. But if the new one “acts independently, maybe a majority of society will be on their side and help Tusk win the election.”

Ultimately, Poland’s conundrum mirrors America’s – how to deal with a deeply polarized political environment. “As long as you have polarization, you have the risk of swings in the judiciary,” says Dr. Lang of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. “This is a moment for consensus, but the logic of the pendulum has been reinforced.”

At some point, voters and politicians will need to insist on norms of behavior that go beyond partisan power. Laws can change the political momentum, but only a shared expectation can make rules binding, says Ms. Inostroza. “The real test is whether you are rebuilding a check that can also bind you.”