Лабораторийн осол болон эмгэг төрүүлэгчдийг зориудаар өөрчлөх судалгаа нь дэлхий дахинд тахал дэгдээх аюулыг улам бүр нэмэгдүүлж байна.
Дэлхий даяар ажиллаж буй BSL-3 болон BSL-4 ангиллын 3,600 орчим лабораторид өндөр хоруу чанар бүхий вирус, бактерийг судлах нь санамсаргүй байдлаар халдвар алдах эрсдэлийг улам бүр нэмэгдүүлж байна. Судлаачид халдвартай материалыг санамсаргүйгээр өөртөө халдварлуулах тохиолдол түүхэнд цөөнгүй гарч байсан бөгөөд энэ нь тухайн лабораторийн аюулгүй байдлын протоколоос үл хамааран хүний хүчин зүйлээс үүдэлтэй аюул болохыг харуулж байна.
Орчин үеийн генетикийн инженерчлэл, хиймэл оюун ухааны тусламжтайгаар вирус болон бактерийн шинж чанарыг өөрчлөх “gain-of-function” буюу үйл ажиллагааны хүрээг тэлэх судалгаанууд нь эрсдэлийн шинэ түвшинг бий болгож байна. Тухайлбал, өмнө нь зөвхөн амьтдын дунд тархдаг байсан вирусийг агаар дуслын замаар хүнд халдварлах чадвартай болгон хувиргах туршилтууд нь нийгмийн эрүүл мэндэд ноцтой аюул учруулж болзошгүй юм.
Зарим эрдэмтдийн дунд ажиглагдаж буй эрдэм шинжилгээний хэт их бардамнал нь аюултай судалгааны үр дүнг олон нийтэд ил тод болгох, хяналтгүйгээр түгээхэд хүргэж байна. Энэхүү элит үзэл нь олон нийт болон үндэсний аюулгүй байдлын шийдвэр гаргагчдыг үйл явцын аюултай талыг ойлгох боломжгүй гэж үзэхэд хүргэж байгаа нь мэргэжилтнүүдийн зүгээс ихээхэн болгоомжлол төрүүлж байна.
Дэлгэрэнгүйг эх сурвалжаас харах
↓Эх сурвалжийг нээх ↓
What I came to understand is that the only people crazy enough to deploy or release a biological weapon into the community, knowing full well that the blowback would be extraordinary and would create a pandemic around the world, would be someone who had a death wish. Many terrorists fit that that category, so that is deeply unsettling. But that’s a smaller group.
And then you think about all the people—scientists, nation states, academic institutions—that are manipulating pathogens for greater virulence, for greater transmissibility in these BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs [Biosafety Level 4 is the highest security designation]. I mean, there are 3,600 of those labs around the world. There are not 3,600 terrorist organizations that I am aware of. So the chance for an accident is statistically far greater. That’s why I begin my scenario with a lab leak, and also because it’s happened before.
One can imagine a researcher sticking themself with a syringe at a BSL-4 lab and freaking out, humans being humans, and kind of going into denial and heading home.
One hundred percent—and as has happened. Then you have other examples, like [Nikolai] Ustinov, whom I wrote about in a little history lesson in the book, sticking himself with a deadly Marburg virus, from which there is no cure, and doing the good Soviet scientist thing, which is tell on himself, and then be left in a isolation ward behind sort of submarine-lock type doors to die a horrific death by hemorrhagic fever. Accidents happen.
You and I have both written on the risks of gain-of-function research, like reconstituting pandemic flu strains that can spread among ferrets—god help us if that ever got out. You write in the book that it was after 9/11, when someone was mailing around anthrax, when the riskiest research accelerated.
Yes, and I think it’s interesting. With anthrax, you’re a “dead-end host,” meaning if you breathe it in, it will kill you but it’s not transmissible. The anthrax wasn’t ever going to become a pandemic. It was meant to make people experience terror. But it’s very different when you’re talking about an airborne pathogen.
And so, flash forward to where we are now, with [advanced] genetic engineering, with gain of function research, with AI-enabled bio, and you have a situation whereby everything is on the table in terms of pandemic potential. You can tweak things. Scientists in a lab can work to create a pathogen that’s able to evade existing immunity, like the mouse pox experiment, or make something airborne, like the H5N1 ferret flu experiments. We are in a completely different world now.
I was taken aback when I called up that flu researcher, how arrogant he was: Of course you have to publish the sequence of this incredibly deadly thing. He didn’t think twice about it. There’s a hubris with some of these guys.
A hubris, or an elitism, where you talk down to the laymen because they are not scientists. As if they can’t make decisions about national security or public health because they are not scientists. I find that incredibly alarming. One of the things that’s been most impactful about my scenario books, both nuclear and bio, is that I have had subject-matter experts around the world, people who write treaties, the cardinals at the Vatican, diplomats at the United Nations, say to me: “Thank you for making this very simple to understand.”
